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Jon Stewart's The Daily Show was well-known for its left leaning political satire. 
Although the program focused on the United States, from time to time Stewart 
broadened the coverage and examined political events in other countries. Over the 
years, the policies adopted by the Israeli government had been among his satirical 
targets. A section dealing with Israel’s 2014 military campaign in Gaza caught our 
eyes, since in the map suspended behind Stewart Israel's borders were not drawn 
according to the internationally recognized 1949 armistice agreements (Figure 1). The 
map is accurate in the sense that Israel's borders do not encompass the Palestinian 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, but its depiction of the Golan Heights as an integral part 
of Israel is flawed. The fact that Stewart's team chose this map is, however, hardly 
coincidental, since many existing maps have erased the line separating the Golan from 
Israel.  
Figure 1 about here 
Reflecting on the difference between the West Bank and the Golan Heights, 
two areas that Israel occupied in the June 1967 War, Meir Shalev, one of Israel's most 
popular authors, remarked that ‘The holy sites of the West Bank represent today the 
pinnacles of lunacy, evilness and stupidity… The Golan, on the other hand, is the only 
normal territory we have left. It has no holy tombs, sites of religious frenzy or a large 
downtrodden and rebellious population’ (Shalev 1994, emphasis added). Normal for 
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Shalev means uncontested, familiar, or as one Israeli journalist once said, more Israeli 
than Israel itself (Shalev 2010). Nachum Barnea, a prominent Israeli journalist, 
offered an interesting account of why the Golan Heights became ‘normal’. ‘In the 
beginning there was fear’, he wrote. ‘The Syrian plateau posed a tangible threat to the 
[Israeli] valley. Then the remaining [Syrian] residents were removed. Their expulsion 
was necessary. The [Israeli] Labour movement does not occupy anything other than 
empty land; where the emptiness was not complete, it took care to make it 
complete...’ (Barnea 1994). If one juxtaposes these two vignettes alongside the map 
used in The Daily Show then an important question arises: Did the removal of the 
Golan's Syrian population help produce its perceived Israeliness?   
 Building on existing research into ethnic cleansing, in the following pages 
we examine how the relative completeness or incompleteness of ethnic cleansing 
helps shape colonial geographies. We claim that there is a relation between the 
relative completeness of the ethnic cleansing and the type of settler colonialism that is 
produced. Relatively complete ethnic cleansing produces a ‘refined’ form of settler 
colonialism resembling the colonial geographies of North America and Australia and 
is characterized by the ability to normalize the contested space. In this form of settler 
colonialism, contradictions and excesses are less obvious since the indigenous 
population was almost completely cleansed and the landscape was reproduced 
through comprehensive destruction of indigenous spaces. By contrast, incomplete or 
less complete ethnic cleansing produces an ‘intermediate’ form of settler colonialism 
similar to the colonial regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa before the settlers lost 
power and is characterized by a series of contradictions stemming from the settler's 
inability to totally prohibit the indigenous population's access to the territory—the 
primary objective of settler colonialism (Rose 1991).1  
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 By ethnic cleansing we do not mean a genocidal campaign, but rather ‘a 
purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and 
terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group 
from certain geographic areas’ (United Nations, 1994). Accordingly, the violence of 
ethnic cleansing is directed at emptying a space of certain populations (ethnic or 
religious groups) and has a spatial dimension that is vital to the definition of the 
violence. Genocidal violence, by contrast, focuses on the extermination of populations 
and its object is the human body, while the spatial dimension exists but is incidental. 
Interestingly, most of the scholarly literature has emphasized how ethnic cleansing is 
associated with the collapse of governing apparatuses, and is both a driving force and 
a product of human created catastrophes, but has dedicated only scant attention to the 
implicit objective of the cleansing: the effort to secure and normalize a new political 
order within a contested or colonized territory. Our claim is that the degree of ethnic 
cleansing is vital for understanding the new political order since the presence or 
absence of the "indigenous other" (Veracini 2008) helps determine the spatial and 
legal configurations produced within the territory where the cleansing took place. 
This, in turn, has an impact on the territory's normalization, where normalization 
means the construction of the space in question as ordinary, familiar and, indeed, 
uncontested in the eyes of the majority of the population whose side is responsible for 
carrying out the cleansing.   
In order to advance this argument, we tap into the existing literature on settler 
colonialism. We espouse Patrick Wolfe's (1999, 2006) claim that settler colonialism is 
a structure, and embrace Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen's (2005) position that 
the structure is not homogeneous and can take on different forms and operate in 
diverse ways according to the circumstances that produced it (Elkins & Pedersen, 
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2005). Yet, unlike Elkins and Pedersen who highlight different structural 
manifestations of settler societies such as the level of settler control and settler 
privilege, we contend that the relative completeness or incompleteness of the ethnic 
cleansing plays a vital role in determining the particular makeup of the colonial 
geography and the legal framework that are introduced in the region.  More precisely, 
the relative completeness or lack thereof of ethnic cleansing configures the actual 
structure – refined or intermediate – of the colonial geography by shaping 1) the 
specific way space is reproduced, and 2) the legal regime that is instituted within that 
space.  It is important to add, however, that insofar that ethnic cleansing is not a 'one-
off occurrence' (Wolfe 2006, 388), then these settler colonial structures are to a 
certain extent fluid, changing overtime according to the quantity and proportion of the 
cleansing within a given period. 
In order to uncover this less acknowledged—because profoundly disturbing—
feature of ethnic cleansing we compare two territories that were occupied by the same 
state during the same military campaign (the June 1967 War): the Syrian Golan 
Heights and the Palestinian West Bank. Out of a population of 128,000 Syrians living 
in the Golan Heights before the war, only 6,500 or five per cent remained in the 
territory after the war (Kipnis, 2013, 56-60). In the West Bank, by contrast, out of a 
population of approximately 850,000 before the war, about 600,000 or seventy per 
cent remained in the region in its aftermath (Ennab 1994; ICBS 1967 at Perlmann 
2011).  Focusing on the two intricately tied sites of social management—spatial 
reproduction and legal governance—we argue that the relative completeness or lack 
thereof of ethnic cleansing not only shapes colonial geographies but also influences 
the ability to normalize colonial spaces. More specifically, we show how the scope of 
the ethnic cleansing carried out in the Golan Heights helped produce a refined form of 
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settler colonialism, while the partial ethnic cleansing carried out in the West Bank 
produced an intermediate form of settler colonialism. The comparison of governing 
technics employed by the same state in the two territories that it occupied during the 
same war enables us to understand the impact of ethnic cleansing on settler colonial 
geographies and the forms of spatial and social management.  
The paper is divided into four main parts. Following an overview of the 
literature on ethnic cleansing, we briefly outline our methodology. Next, we concisely 
compare the degree of ethnic cleansing carried out in the Golan Heights and West 
Bank. In the third and main part, we expose how the relative completeness or 
incompleteness of ethnic cleansing created two forms of colonial geographies: refined 
and intermediate. To do so, we compare the movement of settlers to each region, the 
lay out of the settlements and the modes of legal governance in the two regions. By 
way of conclusion, we examine the relation between the form of the colonial 
geography and its normalization.  
 
I. ETHNIC CLEANSING 
During the brutal and prolonged civil war in the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995), 
western commentators translated and popularized the Serbo-Croatian phrase 
‘etnicko ci scenje’, thus rendering the term ethnic cleansing familiar to international 
audiences (Petrovic, 1994, 343). Notwithstanding the succinct definition provided 
above and the fact that ethnic cleansing is always achieved by violence, fear and 
terror, the reasons leading to its implementation, the way it is carried out, and the 
scope and extent of its execution vary greatly from case to case (Mann, 2005). 
 Ethnic cleansing can take place within a state or across international borders, 
and unfold within a short span of time or during a slow and painful process of 
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expulsion (Bell-Fialkoff, 1996). Regardless of how, when, where and by whom ethnic 
cleansing is carried out, it is based on the premise that a certain ethnic group must be 
expelled from a certain space, while the space, in turn, is often reified as part of 
another ethnic homeland (Naimark, 2001). Expulsion, however, is only one aspect of 
the cleansing. Another prominent feature involves the intentional plan to wipe out any 
proof of the displaced population's presence. This is often achieved through the 
destruction of the latter's lived environment, and the erasure of any signs of their 
culture and history (Doel & Clarke, 1998; Tyner 2014). As we show below, the ability 
to erase the culture and history and to reshape the geography is also dependent on the 
relative completeness of the ethnic cleansing that is carried out. 
Ethnic cleansing also tends to be tied to settler colonialism, since this form of 
colonialism is premised on gaining access to territory by removing the ‘indigenous 
other’ from their land (Rose, 1991; Veracini, 2010; Wolfe, 1999), while the depleted 
area is often resettled by other ethnic groups. Settler colonialism may be carried out 
through the forceful relocation of the colonizing state's citizens, the movement of 
willful settlers, or a mixture of both (McGarry, 1998). Usually, the act of resettlement 
is conducted in order to prevent the return of the expelled population (Tuathail & 
Dahlman, 2006). The settling act commonly aims to undo the demographic cavity that 
was created during the cleansing and is rationalized through a narrative that 
emphasizes a (frequently constructed) historical relation between the settlers’ ethnic 
identity and the cleansed space (Kaufman, 2001).  
Although the term only became widely used in the 1990s in relation to the 
Balkans, Nagorno-Karabakh (Rieff, 1997) and Rwanda (White, 2009), the concept of 
ethnic cleansing has gained significant traction as a growing number of scholars have 
applied it in their analysis of various historical events featuring forceful population 
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removal. These, to name a few, include the expulsion of Native Americans from their 
indigenous lands (Anderson, 2005), the transfer of Ottoman Muslims from the 
Balkans (Mccarthy, 1995), and the displacement of European Jewry and Roma 
communities from various locations in Europe during the Second World War 
(Solonari, 2010). As Michael Mann cogently argued in his monumental study of 
ethnic cleansing and democracies (2005), ethnic cleansing is the outcome of the 
national drive to create a construable and controllable territory for a specific demos 
that is based on a specific ethnos. In addition, one finds a growing debate on the exact 
characterization of ethnic cleansing and its relation to other forms of systematic 
violence such as genocide, ethnocide or politicide (Sjoberg, Gill, Williams & Kuhn, 
1995).   
Within this vast literature there is one crucial methodological observation that 
is particularly relevant to us. Following Tuathail and O’Loughlin (2009), we maintain 
that ethnic cleansing should be regarded as a form of geopolitics that strives to shape 
an existing spatial order (see also Wood, 2001). We accordingly propose that the 
relative completeness or lack thereof of ethnic cleansing informs the structure of a 
settler colonial regime since it influences the production of space, the forms of 
population management (Foucault and others 2009) and the structures of violence that 
are imposed, thus providing an explanation why in different regions different 
biopolitical techniques are imposed. Different degrees of ethnic cleansing, in other 
words, tend to produce different colonial geographies and biopolitical regimes. 
By biopolitics (Foucault 2003) we mean a form of governance that operates on 
the population as a whole. Biopolitics does not replace the deployment of sovereign or 
disciplinary power, but as opposed to the latter it operates on a different scale while 
applying a series of distinct instruments. It too is continuous and spread out, but if 
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discipline seeks to administer the individual subject, biopower manages the individual 
only insofar as he or she is a member of a population. Biopower employs an array of 
institutions that coordinate and regulate medical care, welfare services, the economy, 
and so forth, while configuring and circumscribing the political sphere and 
normalizing knowledge.  In order to manage the population, biopower uses statistical 
devices and scientific methods as well as mechanisms of surveillance. It measures and 
intervenes in a set of processes relating to mortality rate, longevity, the fertility of the 
population, hygiene, vaccinations, prevalent illnesses in a population, birth rates, 
unemployment rates, the distribution of labor in terms of age, gender, and sectors of 
occupation, per capita income, and so on.  Our claim is that the relative completeness 
or incompleteness of the ethnic cleansing and demolition of the built environment, 
which are forms of sovereign violence, shaped the ways through which biopolitics 
was exercised in each region. 
We exemplify our claim by drawing on a large corpus of empirical evidence 
about Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights and the West Bank. Our sources 
include archival material from The Israeli State Archive (ISA), the Israeli Defence 
Force Archive (IDFA), the Central Zionist Archive (CZA) and the Golan Archive 
(GA) as well as the 1967 census carried out by Israel in the West Bank a few weeks 
after the war. In addition, we examined scores of military, United Nations and human 
rights reports published from 1967 onwards, and perused the archives of four daily 
newspapers: Davar, Ha'aretz, Yediot Achronot and Ma'ariv as well as several public 
opinion polls.  Finally, we also use the findings and insights of the massive body of 
scholarly literature that has been published on these two regions over the years.  
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II. ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THE WEST 
BANK 
While our analysis focuses on the period that followed the 1967 war, the ensuing 
investigation cannot be adequately understood without acknowledging the link 
between Israel's policies in the West Bank and Golan Heights and the ethnic cleansing 
that took place during and in the aftermath of the 1948 war (Abu-Lughod, 1971; 
Khalidi, Elmusa, & Khalidi, 1992; Sa'di & Abu-Lughod, 2007). It was then that about 
750,000 out of 900,000 Palestinians who were living in what became Israel either fled 
or were forcefully displaced across international borders (Morris, 1987; Pappe, 2006). 
Several researchers have discussed the removal of Palestinians from the space that 
became Israel (Falah, 1996; 2003) and situated the act within the larger context of 
Zionist ideology (Shafir and Peled, 2002) and the Judiazation policy that guided 
Israeli decision-makers (Rishmawi, 1987; Yiftachel and Rumley, 1991).  
This policy included several components, including the expropriation of 
Palestinian land and confinement of the Palestinians that remained in Israel into 
demarcated and circumscribed areas (Falah, 1991; Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2004; Forman 
& Kedar, 2004; Shai, 2006; Robinson, 2013). Scholars further stress Israel’s effort to 
preserve a viable ethno-centric democratic regime, which some have defined as an 
ethnocracy (Yiftachel, 2006) and others as a colonial democracy (Gordon, 2010).  
Hence, the spatial reconstruction of Israeli space before 1967 was already based upon 
a settler colonial paradigm whereby the indigenous other is reduced to a 'manageable' 
remnant (Veracini, 2011).  
It is, accordingly, not altogether surprising that when Israel occupied the 
Golan Heights (or the Syrian plateau, as it was referred to in Israel at the time), it 
dramatically reduced the indigenous population (Harris, 1978; Ram, 2013; 2015).  
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Israel's main tactic was intimidation and, occasionally, forceful removal of the civilian 
population who remained in the Golan after the fighting subsided (Harris, 1980; 
Murphy & Gannon, 2008). Furthermore, Syrian residents of the area who were caught 
attempting to return to their villages were brought before a military tribunal and 
deported (IDFA, 1967a). Thus, within a couple of months after the Golan Heights' 
occupation only 6,404 Syrians remained in an area that had been populated by about 
128,000 people before the war (Kipnis, 2013: 56-60; IDFA, 1967b; ISA, 1967a), 
indicating that almost 95 percent of the population had been removed. This created 
the conditions for implementing a refined form of settler colonialism and, as we will 
see, the introduction of more liberal biopolitical techniques of population control, by 
which we mean, following Foucault, less interference, allowing free movement, and 
letting things 'follow their course so that the [colonial] reality develops and follows its 
own course according to the laws, principles, and mechanisms of the reality itself' 
(Foucault and others 2009 p. 70). Liberal bioplitical techniques, as Foucault 
underscores in a different context, can be a correlative of the deployment of 
apparatuses (dispositif) of security, where security means the management of the life 
of populations as opposed to disciplinary practices that are exercised on the bodies of 
individuals.  
By contrast, an estimated 850,000 Palestinians lived in the West Bank before 
the 1967 war (Ennab 1994; based on extrapolation from the 1961 Jordanian census), 
while an Israeli census, carried out in the summer of 1967 indicates that 599,000 
Palestinians were still in the region after the war (ICBS 1967 posted in full at Perlman 
2011). Accordingly, approximately 250,000 inhabitants or thirty percent of the 
population fled or was expelled to Jordan during the 1967 war and its direct 
aftermath, while only 17,000 were ultimately allowed to return (Gazit, 1995). Hence, 
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in this area the form of settler colonialism that was produced was intermediate and, as 
we will show, the biopolitical techniques that were utilized were predominantly 
illiberal.  
We now turn to demonstrate how the difference in the degree of ethnic 
cleansing shaped the two colonial geographies by outlining the differences in the 
production of space and the character of the legal regime in each region. 
 
III. ETHNIC CLEANSING AND COLONIAL GEOGRAPHIES 
Spatial Reproduction  
The production of space in the Golan Heights commenced through a process of 
wholesale destruction, as is often the case in refined forms of settler colonialism. 
Immediately after the war, a list of abandoned Golan villages designated for 
preservation was compiled by the Israel Nature Reserves Authority and handed over 
to the Land Authority (ISA, 1967a; ISA, 1967b; 1968a). Of the 139 Arab agricultural 
villages and 61 individual farms registered prior to the war, only seven villages were 
designated to remain (GA, 1967; IDFA, 1967a).  The almost complete removal of the 
Syrian population from the Golan Heights during the war created the conditions for 
the systematic demolition of these villages, farms, and houses, while the extensive 
destruction facilitated the reproduction of space. This initial act of destruction was 
similar to the destruction of Palestinian built environment after the 1948 war and the 
shaping of Israeli landscape in the pre-1967 borders (Leshem, 2013). In other words, 
the Golan's landscape underwent a process of "violent erasure" (Tyner 2014) because, 
as Patrick Wolfe (2006, 388) points out, 'Settler colonialism destroys to replace’. 
Unlike the Golan Heights, the West Bank remained populated and therefore 
the extent of destruction during and in the immediate aftermath of the war was 
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considerably more restricted characterizing, as it were, an intermediate form of settler 
colonialism. According to Israel's 1967 census—except for the three villages in the 
Latrun enclave, several hamlets, as well as refugee camps in the Jordan valley—
almost all of the over 300 Palestinian villages, refugee camps and towns were not 
fully vacated (ICBS 1967 posted in full at Perlman 2011), and remained standing 
after the war. Avi Raz (2012: 103-136) does, however, document several instances of 
spatial destruction. More than 40 percent of Qalqilyah’s dwellings—some 850 
houses—had been demolished, while in Zeita, a village located near the Green Line, 
about one-third of the buildings were torn down. These examples of demolitions were 
part of a broader policy aimed at clearing the area adjacent to the western border of as 
many inhabitants as possible. Even though Israel ended up destroying hundreds if not 
thousands of houses, almost all of the towns and villages close to the border 
ultimately remained intact due to the fact that they were not completely depopulated.  
The demolitions in each area served different purposes. In the West Bank the 
destruction was carried out primarily in order to propel the population to leave certain 
areas; and, in the case of the Latrun enclave, in order to ensure that those who had 
been expelled would not return. In the Golan Heights, it was executed not only in 
order to guarantee that the Syrian population would never return but also in order to 
shape the colonized space in a new way. More importantly, the varying degree of 
demolition not only had a direct effect on the colonial geography of each region, but 
also on the legal framework and biopolitical technologies that were introduced. 
Insofar as the establishment of settlements and the relocation of settlers to colonized 
spaces are techniques of biopolitics (as we show below), then one can also appreciate 
how ethnic cleansing determines the settling processes and in this way partly shapes 
the biopolitical regime that is instituted.  
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The Golan Heights was the first of the territories to be settled by Israeli 
civilians after the June 1967 war. As early as July of that same year, a group of 
settlers from the Labour Party affiliated United Kibbutz Movement moved into 
abandoned Syrian barracks (Gorenberg, 2006: 72-98). Within the next decade and a 
half, 30 settlements were established housing several thousand Jewish settlers 
(currently there are 34 settlements). In the West Bank the colonization process also 
began not long after the war. During the first years, three kinds of settlements were 
created: civilian military bases (i.e., military outposts that were established on Israel’s 
frontiers and gradually converted into civilian agricultural communities), religious 
settlements and neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem (built on land that had been an 
integral part of the West Bank prior to the war). Military bases were established in the 
Jordan Valley and other strategic sites and were later converted into civilian 
settlements, usually populated by secular Jews affiliated with the Labour Party (Zertal 
and Eldar, 2007). These were considered strategic settlements. Religious settlements 
were created in the heart of the West Bank. These were considered political 
settlements, since in contrast to the strategic ones the motivation behind them is not 
military but rather messianic (Zertal and Eldar, 2007). Thirdly, Israel built Jewish 
neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem in order to undermine the city’s east/west divide 
and alter the demographic balance between Jews and Palestinians in the city (Mattar, 
1983).  
By the late 1970s, Israel initiated a fourth kind of settlement often referred to as 
‘suburban settlements’, catering to middle-class Israeli citizens who worked in urban 
centres and wanted to improve their lifestyle (Newman, 1996).  And, then, in the early 
1990s it founded two ultra-orthodox cities in the West Bank (Mnookin & Eiran, 
2005). It was precisely these two newer types of settlements that attracted the post-
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Oslo mass movement from Israel proper to the West Bank (Gordon & Cohen, 2012). 
Finally, at the dawn of the new millennium religious settlers began creating outposts 
throughout the West Bank, and while most outposts house only few people they 
actually substantially improve Israel's control of the occupied territory (Mnookin & 
Eiran, 2005; Sasson, 2005) (more on this below). Currently, there are about 120 
Jewish settlements and about the same number of outposts in the West Bank (Peace 
Now Settlement Watch).  
While it may appear intuitive that the production of empty land—through the 
depopulation and wholesale destruction of the Golan Heights--would lead Israel to 
build more settlements in that region, actually at least four times as many settlements 
were built in the West Bank, a difference that becomes crucial insofar as settlements 
are not merely architectural edifices but part of a biopolitical regime aimed at 
managing the indigenous other. Hence, the different degree of demolition in each 
territory had a profound impact on the colonial geographies as well as on the legal 
framework and biopolitical techniques employed by the state.  
 
Settlers 
The variance relating to the number of settlers in each region is also worth noting. In 
2013, 21,000 settlers lived in the Golan Heights (ICBS Statistical Abstracts 2014), 
while in the West Bank there were 356,000 settlers (ICBS Statistical Abstracts 2014) 
and an estimated 200,000 in occupied East Jerusalem (Gordon and Cohen 2012). Two 
reasons are usually offered to explain the disparity between the two settlement 
projects: eschatological and geographic. Unlike the Golan, the West Bank is believed 
to be the heart of the biblical land of Israel and certain sectors among the religious 
Jewish population considered Israel’s victory in the 1967 war as the ‘beginning of 
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redemption’ and as an opportunity to realize the vision of a Greater Israel through a 
massive settlement project (Feige, 2009). Geographically, the Golan Heights—when 
compared to the West Bank—is far from Israel's economic centre, and it is presumed 
that the distance serves as an obstacle for relocating a large number of people to that 
region (Kipnis, 2013).  
The West Bank's eschatological importance and its geographical proximity to 
the centre of Israel surely help explain the quantitative difference between the two 
settlement projects.  But we would like to add that ethnic cleansing also explains the 
difference in settler population in the two regions. In the Golan Heights, the 
indigenous population does not have the required mass to mount an effective 
separatist campaign, and the transfer of 21,000 settlers was enough to secure a 
demographic balance in the region. Therefore, the state has had less incentive to 
transfer more citizens to the Golan.  By contrast, in the West Bank the movement of 
large numbers of settlers was consciously geared towards countering the will of the 
indigenous Palestinians to establish their own state within this region (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1983), while simultaneously the Jewish settlers have been used—
wittingly or not—as a civilian technology of biopolitical control (Gordon 2008).  
While one might assume that ethnic cleansing would spur the relocation of 
population from the core state to the 'empty territory', the two cases suggest that an 
opposite dynamic can also materialize: the existence of an indigenous population can 
also drive the core state to transfer its citizens to the newly colonized region. Hence, 
at least in the Israeli case the degree of ethnic cleansing has had an inverse impact on 
the efforts of the core state to settle it. Insofar as the settler population is conceived of 
as a technology of indigenous control (and not merely a vehicle for exploiting 
resources) then the more a space is depleted of its indigenous inhabitants, the less the 
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effort to populate it. It is here that one can identify a direct link between the policies 
within the Green Line and the post-1967 colonized areas. As mentioned, throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s the government made a concerted effort to move Israeli Jews to 
the Galilee where Palestinians (who remained following the 1948 war) had large a 
majority (Falah, 1989, 1991), but at the time there was less of an effort to settle the 
Negev because its Bedouin population had been depleted during and after the war 
from an estimated 110,000 to 11,000 people (Nasasra, 2012). Currently, however, the 
effort to Judaize the Negev has accelerated not least because the birth rate of the 
Bedouin population is very high and the population has increased substantially to over 
220,000 (ICBS Statistical Abstracts 2014). Put differently, the same colonial 
rationalities that shaped Israel's internal frontiers after 1948 (Yiftachel and Segal, 
1991) were also evident in the territories the state colonized after 1967. 
   
Colonial settlements 
Not only the settler population and the number of settlements, but also the layout of 
the settlements across the terrain and even the architecture of the buildings has been 
informed by the act of ethnic cleansing. In the Golan Heights, the layout of the 
settlements was initially determined by economic considerations (Harris, 1980; Efrat, 
2012; Kipnis, 2013). Kibbutzim were erected mainly in the north and moshavim in 
the south where the terrain was more conducive to agriculture (Ram, 2015). Only at a 
later stage were a number of settlements established in the region's centre and close to 
the border where agriculture was limited due to the topography.  
 Freddy Kahana, the architect who planned kibbutz Merom Golan, the first 
settlement established on the Golan Heights, said in a 2000 interview that people 
initially wanted to build the kibbutz on top of a volcanic hill, but he decided to embed 
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the kibbutz in the ‘earth as close as possible to the slopes’ and in this way shield the 
built environment from possible Syrian shelling (Azoulai, 2000; see Figure 2).  
Kahana explains:  
Merom Golan was definitely not based on the idea of a 
fortress. It was a normal settlement, in normal conditions 
whose defences are not in its own hands. The region was 
not hostile, the enemy was located five kilometres from 
the border, and facing the enemy there were a series of 
Israeli tanks. We did not establish a settlement with a wall 
around it that could be counted on to defend itself with a 
few guns; we just thought how people and children could 
reach a shelter if the settlement was shelled (Azoulai, 
2000, 45). 
Kahana's underlying assumption is that the Golan Heights is empty of an indigenous 
other. The enemy he refers to are the Syrians who are located across the international 
border. Hence, the settlement is not conceived as a biopolitical technology aimed at 
managing or controlling an indigenous population. Moreover, the Golan’s open 
landscape devoid of checkpoints is characteristic of a refined form of settler 
colonialism. 
   
Figure 2 about here 
 
The function of settlements in the West Bank has been very different. Unlike Merom 
Golan, they were almost always built on hilltops overlooking Palestinian villages 
(note that the topography of the two regions is also different) so that they could serve 
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as mechanisms of civilian surveillance (B'Tselem, 2002). In and of themselves the 
settlements’ built-up areas comprises less than two percent of the West Bank, but their 
regional and municipal boundaries comprise almost 42 percent of the land. These 
boundaries were created to restrict Palestinian movement and undermine their 
development.  Simply put, Palestinians are banned from using 'settlement land' for 
agriculture or for extending their lived environment, and they are even prohibited 
from entering large parts of this area, thus hindering their ability to move freely even 
within the West Bank (Ibid: 116). Already in 1980, the settler movement explained 
that ‘[Their] control of a region is a function not only of the size of the population 
which resides within the region, but also of the size of the area in which this 
population exercises its influence’ (Ministry of Agriculture, 1983). 
The settlements in the West Bank have provided, according to Eyal Weizman 
(2007: 139-161), three strategic assets: greater tactical strength, self-protection, and a 
wider view. The distribution, layout, and architectural design of the settlements were 
determined by strategic military principles so that, in Weizman’s words, the “simple 
act of domesticity, a single family home shrouded in the cosmetic façade of red tiles 
and green lawns, conforms to the aims of territorial” and social control. The 
settlements’ strategic function was integrated into their distribution and topographical 
location so that they created a ‘network of observation’ that overlooks the main traffic 
arteries of the West Bank (Segal et al., 2003 pp. 85-86). The desire to maximize the 
visibility of the indigenous Palestinian population dictated the mode of design of the 
settlements, down to the positioning of windows in houses, thus transforming 
settlements into ‘optical devices, designed to exercise control through supervision and 
surveillance’ (Segal et al., 2003 p. 24).  
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The West Bank’s colonial geography is, accordingly, made up of biopolitical 
artefacts that aim to render the occupied inhabitants visible and docile. The 
settlements are used to monitor the Palestinians who work in the fields below or travel 
on the adjacent roads and in this way function as panoptic towers. Indeed, as Ariel 
Handel (2013) demonstrates, the roads connecting the settlements also function as a 
complex mechanism of social control. Ironically, the settlements and roads are a more 
exact model of Foucault’s notion of surveillance than the panoptic tower (the example 
he uses) since their gaze is not centralized; like Foucauldian power they are not 
located in one identifiable site but are rather capillary, scattered throughout the terrain 
supervising the local inhabitants from numerous spots (Foucault, 1977).  
Finally, it is important to mention that as is often the case with intermediate 
forms of settler colonialism, the West Bank’s landscape is riddled with checkpoints, 
concrete blockades, and dirt mounds, while a 617 kilometre barrier separates between 
the colonized territory and pre-1967 Israel (Sorkin 2005). The significance of these 
obstacles in the context of this article is that the rationale justifying the deployment of 
checkpoints and the construction of the barrier (which are, in and of themselves a 
form of violence) was the need to protect Israeli Jews from the indigenous other 
(Amir 2013). Part of the West Bank barrier was built on the international border, but 
part of it was built deep inside the colonized Palestinian territory. Hence, the barrier is 
also a technology for expropriating Palestinian land, as it cuts-off Palestinians from 
their agricultural fields, schools, work place, and hospitals (Hatuka 2012). It is a 
prime example of how the degree of ethnic cleansing continues to inform the 
production of space and the structures of violence even decades after the cleansing 
was carried out. In this sense, it corroborates Simon Springer's (2009) claim that acts 
of violence are not limited to enclosed and delimited places or restricted to a 
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circumscribed time. Indeed, ethnic cleansing, like other forms of violence, not only 
occurs within place and supersedes place, but also helps determine the (re)creation of 
space over an extended period of time. 
This cursory comparison reveals how the completeness or lack thereof of 
ethnic cleansing in each area determined the function of the settlements (and roads), 
governed the way in which they were laid out, their topographical setting, and even 
the design of the architectural edifices within and outside the settlements. In the Golan 
Heights, the settlements' location was determined primarily by economic concerns 
and issues relating to topographic access and the position of an external enemy (i.e., 
Syria) and were never conceived as a biopolitical technology developed to control the 
indigenous population. By contrast, in the West Bank, settlements were designed as 
biopolitical tools aimed at facilitating control of large swaths of land and monitoring 
the indigenous Palestinians. Interestingly, the spatial configuration of the settlements 
in the West Bank was shaped according to similar parameters that guided the 
establishment of mitzpim and towns in the Galilee between the 1950s and 1970s. For 
example, the town of Kiryat Arba that overlooks Hebron was modelled on the Jewish 
town Upper Nazareth, located above the Palestinian city in the Galilee (Zertal & 
Eldar, 2007, 22). 
 
Rule of law and modes of governance 
Following the war, Israel reinstated the Ottoman, British Mandatory, Egyptian, and 
Jordanian laws that had been in place prior to the war in each of the regions it had 
captured, and over the years, added an array of military orders either to replace 
existing laws or to add new ones (Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli, 2005). The 
difference between the Golan Heights and the West Bank is that in the former, where 
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ethnic cleaning was almost complete, the military commander focused on law-
making, issuing decrees that de facto imposed Israeli civilian law on the Golan and 
almost completely ignored the Syrian laws that existed prior to the occupation 
(Murphy and Gannon, 2008). In the West Bank, where most of the indigenous 
population had remained put, we witness the importance of law-preserving; a decree 
imposing civilian law was never issued, and the Ottoman and Jordanian laws were 
used alongside military orders (Gordon 2008).  
Hence, there appears to be a relation between the degree of ethnic cleansing 
and the precise configuration of law-preserving and law-making in the colonized 
space (Benjamin 1978). The rationale informing the application of civilian law 
through military decrees in the Golan Heights (law-making), which was part of the 
normalization strategy, was grounded in the assumption that the Golan Heights was 
an empty space, free of inhabitants. As a way of justifying the law-making strategy 
official representatives claimed that the Golan Heights had had in place only minimal 
governmental or legal provisions (Levi, 1982: 104). The claim about the absence of 
law in the Golan echoed the notion of ‘emptiness’ referred to in the beginning of this 
article and helped obfuscate the very dynamic that transformed the plateau into a 
space with no trace of rules.  
 In the West Bank, there was no intention of incorporating the residents into 
Israel proper (the pre-1967 borders) because the 600,000 Palestinians residing in the 
region threatened the Jewish demographic majority that the Zionist leadership was 
determined to preserve. Consequently, Israel never imposed its own civilian laws on 
the Palestinians inhabitants and instead used Ottoman and Jordanian laws as well as 
literally thousands of orders issued by the military commander to manage them 
(Shedadah, 1985). Israel also established military courts as opposed to the civilian 
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courts in the Golan (Hajjar, 2005: 132-154). This law-preserving and law-making 
military legal system served as the foundation for almost all of the governing 
apparatuses and practices and in many ways shaped their operations (Gordon, 2008).  
 Each legal system was established according to the degree of ethnic cleansing, 
while it, in turn, shaped the modes of governance that were established in the two 
colonized territories. Generally speaking, when a large proportion of the population 
within the colonized area is indigenous, we can expect the imposition of a less liberal 
legal system and biopolitical technologies. This is also what characterizes an 
intermediate form of settler colonialism, as opposed to a refined one. 
Unlike the Palestinians in the West Bank, the Syrian Druze, were immediately 
allowed to become Israeli residents and received many benefits associated with full 
citizenship. By February 1968, the permit regime in the Golan was considerably 
eased. Syrian residents no longer needed formal authorization to enter Israel or move, 
and were allowed to sell their agriculture products to Israelis without governmental 
mediators while their wages were made commensurate with their Israeli counterparts 
(Haaretz, 1967; Dar, 1968). In addition, the Golan’s residents were incorporated into 
the national health insurance and social security schemes and they enjoyed a series of 
political rights such as the ability to join different organizations like trade unions and 
political parties (Dar, 1973).  
For the first fourteen years the Syrian Druze continued to live under a military 
government, which occasionally confiscated their lands and deployed coercive 
strategies like administrative detention, but was nonetheless much more liberal than 
the military government in the West Bank.2 As one reporter declared in 1971 ‘the 
military government [in the Golan Heights] was so far the most liberal of all the 
[Israeli] military governments in the [occupied] territories. It has respected the Druze, 
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allowed them total freedom of movement and provided them with vocational 
opportunities inside Israel, supplied electricity to the villages, paved roads and 
provided health services’ (Tzidkoni, 1971). Because only a few thousand Syrians had 
remained on the Golan they did not constitute a demographic threat to the Jewish 
character of the State. Consequently, Israel was ultimately willing to pay the price of 
granting them citizenship in exchange for normalizing the incorporation of the region 
into the state. In December 1981, Israel unilaterally annexed the Golan and formally 
extended its own civilian law (this time not through military decree) to the Syrian 
residents who were then offered full citizenship even though, at the time, most of 
them declined to accept it (Yishai, 1985).  The forms of control deployed in the Golan 
Heights and the process of integration of the Syrian residents were very similar to the 
processes used in relation to Palestinians within Israel following the 1948 war and 
characterize a refined form of settler colonialism. Not unlike the Palestinians within 
the pre-1967 borders, the Syrian Druze in the Golan were placed under a military rule 
that slowly integrated them within the state apparatus, and they too were offered an 
opportunity to obtain a formal, yet in some respects nominal, Israeli citizenship 
(Robinson, 2013; Sa'di, 2013).  
In the West Bank there was never any intention of incorporating the 
population into the Israeli demos. Accordingly, the population was managed through 
a military bureaucratic apparatus and did not enjoy many of the basic rights granted to 
Israelis or even the occupied Syrian population, such as the right to freedom of 
movement, speech, and association (Gordon 2008). Since we cannot really capture the 
modes of governance deployed in the West Bank in this article, we will only note that 
Israel established in this region an elaborate permit regime, not unlike the one 
implemented in South Africa (Dayan, 2009), which was characterized by its 
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ubiquitous nature, creating a grid that extended across every part of Palestinian life, 
leaving no space untouched.  
 The permit regime, for example, restricted movement and helped constrain 
the development of an independent Palestinian industry and agriculture and impeded 
Palestinian construction (Military Orders and Proclamations 1967-2014: 65, 88), 
operating also in complex ways to ensure that Palestinian workforce would be made 
up of mostly unskilled labour (Roy, 1995). It is in this context that we should mention 
that our earlier claim about Israeli civilian law never being imposed in the West Bank 
is not entirely accurate. The Jewish settlers, who currently comprise about nine 
percent of Israel's Jewish citizenry (Gordon and Cohen 2012), are extraterritorial 
citizens who, like diplomats, carry Israeli law on their back.  In other words, Israeli 
civilian law is imposed in the West Bank but only in relation to the Jewish settlers. 
Thus, as opposed to the Golan Heights where there is one set of laws that is applicable 
to all the people, in the West Bank two legal systems operate simultaneously, one for 
the Palestinian inhabitants and the other for Israeli citizens. This, again, characterizes 
an intermediate form of settler colonialism and produces an obstacle for Israel's 
efforts to normalize the colonial project. 
This structural difference between the two colonial projects is informed by the 
degree of ethnic cleansing carried out during the war.  The legal duality in the West 
Bank sustains the difference between settler and indigenous inhabitants and 
consequently Israel’s colonial project in this region is both apparent and cannot 
supersede itself. By contrast, in the Golan Heights the distinction between the 
colonizer and colonized is legally obscured, and this alongside the reproduction of 
space helps obfuscate the colonial reality and thus helps normalize Israel’s colonial 
project in this region. It is not a coincidence that most of the scholars (e.g., Gordon, 
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2008; Veracini, 2008; Veracini, 2011; Wolfe, 1999; Wolfe, 2006; Yiftachel, 2006) 
who have examined Israeli settler colonialism have hardly even mentioned the Golan 
Heights. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION: NORMALIZATION AND FORMS OF SETTLER 
COLONIALISM 
While our case study has its unique traits (like all case studies do), it reflects two 
different prototypes of settler colonial structures, which we have characterized as 
refined and intermediate. In the refined form of settler colonialism, the contradictions 
and excesses are less apparent since the indigenous population was completely or 
almost completely cleansed and the landscape was reproduced through 
comprehensive destruction of indigenous spaces (for an example of the inability to 
completely erase the materiality of the indigenous past see Tyner, Alvarez & Colucci, 
2012; for a specific discussion regarding the Golan Heights see Ram, 2015). 
Intermediate settler colonialism is characterized by a series of contradictions because, 
as we mentioned in the introduction, the access to the territory—the primary objective 
of settler colonialism—is never complete so long as the indigenous population stays 
put. Accordingly, intermediate settler colonialism is informed by two oppositional 
forces. The elimination drive (Wolfe, 2006), that aims to finalize the settler colonial 
project by doing away with the indigenous population and thus rendering the whole 
territory accessible—a refined form of settler colonialism. And the repelling drive, 
characterized by indigenous resistance aimed at forcing the settlers to retreat—the 
intermediate form. The struggle between these oppositional forces continuously 
exposes the settler project for what it is, thus rendering it difficult to achieve 
normalization.  
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Among Israel's citizenry the relation to each territory is indeed very different 
even though both regions were colonized during the same war. In a 1974 public 
opinion poll, 86 percent of the Jewish population regarded the Golan as ‘too 
important’ to be returned, and believed that the government should finance the 
Golan’s settlement project. In the West Bank, by contrast, the same poll revealed that 
only 45 percent supported the colonization project (IDFA, 1974), this despite the fact 
that religious Jews consider the West Bank to be part of the biblical land of Israel 
while the Golan has hardly any biblical significance.  In a poll carried out almost four 
decades later, in 2012, over 75 percent of Israeli Jews either strongly disagreed or 
moderately disagreed with the question: ‘In the framework of a peace agreement that 
includes appropriate security arrangements, the Golan Heights could be returned to 
Syria’. By contrast, only 38 percent of Israeli Jews either strongly disagreed or 
moderately disagreed with the question: ‘In the framework of a peace agreement that 
includes appropriate security arrangements, one should agree to the establishment of 
an independent Palestinian state’ (Peace Index, 2012).  
These polls reveal that for many Israelis the Golan Heights has come to be 
regarded as an integral part of Israel, so much so that for them the colonial project has 
been supplanted. The fact that the colonization project was erased from the map 
hovering over Jon Stewart (as well as from scores of other maps) underscores that the 
colonization of the Golan Heights has been normalized. The ability to normalize 
colonial violence and render it invisible is, we maintain, the outcome of the refined 
form of this settler colonial structure.  
There are many reasons why Israel’s colonial project in the West Bank has 
remained intermediate and resisted normalization, but they all have to do with the fact 
that the ethnic cleansing in this region was only partial. While the reproduction of the 
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colonial landscape is vital, perhaps the major reason why many Israelis still do not 
consider the West Bank as an integral part of Israel—even after the state transferred 
over half a million citizens to this swath of land—is their fear that if its Palestinian 
inhabitants were to be incorporated as citizens into the state they would undermine the 
Jewish demographic majority and threaten the state's Jewish character (Smooha, 
1997). Insofar as this is the case, then the aspiration for racial purity among Israeli 
Jews ultimately trumps the desire for territory.  
Other factors also play an important role. Israel considers itself as a democratic 
regime and the ongoing effort to control a territory inhabited by another people 
through military decrees while not offering them citizenship undercuts its democratic 
pretensions (Shafir & Peled, 2002). By contrast, the Golan Heights was legally 
incorporated into Israel precisely because it was almost completely depopulated from 
the ‘indigenous other’. Moreover, the normalization process could proceed because 
the land was regarded as empty and the colonial project was never considered to have 
entailed expropriation and confiscation. Hardly any Syrian villages and towns 
'contaminate' the landscape and therefore there is no permanent reminder of a pre-
colonial existence, while the few remaining indigenous inhabitants did not constitute a 
demographic threat and consequently were granted citizenship and with it liberal 
rights.  
 Although the relative completeness or lack thereof of ethnic cleansing in the 
West Bank and the Golan Heights helped shape the settler colonial geographies in 
each region (one intermediate and the other refined), we maintain, following Wolfe, 
that these prototypes are never static. The act of ethnic cleansing itself as well as the 
demographic proportion between settler and indigenous continue to change. So 
although we have claimed that the difference between the Golan and the West Bank 
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can be traced back to the ethnic cleansing (complete/incomplete) during the 1967 war, 
a more precise argument would acknowledge that there is a dynamic relation between 
the degree of ethnic cleansing and the legal-spatial order producing the settler colonial 
geography. Having said this, the central and indeed extremely disturbing point still 
stands: the degree of ethnic cleansing shapes the structure of colonial geographies.  
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Notes  
                                                          
1  Like all binary typologies in the social sciences, these too represent ideal types. 
2 After the June 1967 war, only six villages remained intact in the Golan Heights: 
Majdal Shams, Mas'ade, Buq'ata, Ein Qiniyye, Shayta and Ghajar. Syrian Druze 
populated all of these localities, except Ghajar (IDFA, 1967a). In addition, the Syrian 
Druze were the only residents that were allowed to return (ISA, 1969). The reason for 
this was that Israel considered the Druze to be more "friendly" population to its rule. 
An assumption that was based on the form of repor that developed between Israel's 
state authorities and its own Druze citizens. For a discussion on the fate of the Syrian 
population from the Golan who fled to Syria see Abu Fakhr, 2007; Szanto, 2012. For 
a discussion on the convoluted relationships between Druze and the Israeli state see 
Firro, 1998. 
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